On Saturday 3/27/21 I had an excellent day linking a pair of lines on Twin: the E Face, which I had rode the previous year, and the NW Couloir, which was new to me.
Based on the day's conditions, this was a daring day of backcountry skiing. I've learned a lot from this outing and have since dialed it back. Much of the details about our decision-making are relayed in this observation I submitted to UAC. For the sake of brevity, I will refrain from reiterating what I've already stated in that observation. Read that if you want some more context.
Anyway... Early in the tour we noticed wind-loading on the E Face from the W-SW while skinning up the drainage. I expressed concerns, and my partner and I agreed that we would continue to reassess the situation as we neared Twin.
Under the E Face we deliberated between booting the face directly or ascending via the south ridge. I suggested booting the E Face because it was fast and I had done so last season. This was the 'Familiarity' in FACETS in motion. Just because I had booted the E Face without hiccup last season does not mean that it would be good to go on this day. This was poor judgment on my behalf and I am glad we did not choose this option.
Thoughts:
- We made A LOT of decisions this day, and I think we got away with some of them. Particularly, we were lucky to arrive at the south ridge after Party #1. If we arrived first, I think we would have gone forward with the bootpack up the ridge. In that case we might have been the group to trigger the wind slab and the consequences could have been much worse for us. It's so hard to say whether this would be the case, which brings me to my next point...
- The attitude I employed on this day is inconsistent with the attitude that I would like to employ every time I go out into consequential avalanche terrain. I like to think that my overall strategy in the mountains leans toward conservative decision-making with an eye on the long game rather than the pursuit of short-term rewards. (This is a rough interpretation of a chart I saw in 'Staying Alive in Avalanche Terrain,' but bear with me) If we travel in avalanche terrain every day for 100 days, we need to make the right decisions 99.99% of the time if we want to survive a lifetime of skiing in avalanche terrain. I am certain that I lack both the knowledge or experience to make the right decision 99.99% of the time, and thus I must turn around or choose safer alternatives when faced with uncertainty. The odds aren't in my favor otherwise.
- E Face ALPTRUTH: Avalanches? Yes; Loading? Yes, wind; Path? Yep; Terrain Trap? Yes; Rating? Low; Unstable Snow? Yes; Thawing? No. Five of the factors were present, so the odds were not in our favor here.
- NW Couloir ALPTRUTH: Avalanches? None observed; Loading? Yes, at the top; Path? Yep; Terrain Trap? Yes; Rating? Low; Unstable Snow? Yes at the top, no lower in the couloir; Thawing? No. This one is less clear cut. It seems we were right on the cusp. In any event, decisions made on the cusp are not the ones that increase your chances of surviving in the backcountry.
- I think we were both motivated for a big day on Twin, and that certainly affected our decision-making. It would have taken more than just some shallow wind slabs to get us to turn around. But like Noah Howell said, high motivation gets parties in trouble. Indeed, a shallow wind slab carried someone off of their feet that day, so conditions were not as 'manageable' as we perceived.
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